The year-end disturbance in the prices of small stocks that has come to be known as the January effect is arguably the most celebrated of the many stock market anomalies discovered during the past two decades. T he January effect is, perhaps, the best-known example of anomalous behavior in security markets throughout the world. At the turn of the year, certain types of securities tend to produce abnormal returns. Most of the attention has centered on stocks with small market capitalization. Throughout most of this century, small stocks have tended to produce greater returns than large stocks, and the lion's share of the small-stock premium is earned in the first ten trading days in January. 1
Since its reintroduction, the January effect has been the subject of many academic and applied journal articles and at least one book in the popular press. It would be safe to say that the majority of the professional investment community is very much aware of it, the most celebrated anomaly of financial markets.
One would expect that an anomaly this well known would quickly disappear as investors attempt to exploit it. One avenue would be the futures markets. By taking long positions in contracts on an approximately equally weighted index, such as the Value Line, and short positions in a capitalizationweighted index, such as the S&P 500, investors can exploit the tendency of small stocks to outperform at the turn of the year. One would also expect money managers to initiate early entry into their desired positions to avoid the price pressure on less-liquid stocks that is evident at the beginning of the year. For example, one would expect managers to expedite the processing of new accounts in December to avoid the turbulence in January. Because they share transaction costs with other fund members, one also would expect individual investors to transfer money to mutual funds investing in small stocks in December to capitalize on the premium returns earned by these stocks in January. As relative pressure is put on futures prices for small stocks, as professional investors attempt to enter the market ahead of the effect, and as small-stock mutual funds react to the inflow of funds in December by increasing their inventories of small stocks, Based on the evidence presented here, however, the January effect is not disappearing.
We examined the monthly returns to New York Stock Exchange firms from 1926 through 1993 and documented the existence of the January effect throughout the period. More important, there has been no significant reduction in the magnitude of the effect since its rediscovery in 1976.
METHODOLOGY
Our sample included all stocks on the NYSE in the CRSP monthly data file from 1926 through 1993. At the beginning of each year, we ranked these stocks on the basis of total market capitalization. The stocks were then formed into equally weighted deciles, and within each decile, the following time-series regressions were run over the full period: where
monthly rate of return to decile j in month t dummy variable taking a value of I if t is a January month and 0 otherwise long-term time trend variable equal to year t -1977 dummy variable taking a value of 1 after 1976 and 0 otherwise short-term time trend variable taking a value of t -1977 after 1976 and 0 otherwise ej, t = unexplained component of the return to decile j in month t The coefficient on the variable J measures the difference between the average return for the decile in January relative to the other months. The product of J and LT measures any trend in the difference over the entire sample period. The product of J and A represents the difference in the magnitude of the January effect between the period since 1976 and the overall period. The product of J and ST measures any trend in the January effect since its reintroduction to the investment world in 1976. Table I shows the results of Regression I over the size deciles and for an equally weighted index of all the stocks. For all but the largest deciles, the January returns are significantly larger than for other months. Moreover, the difference decreases monotonically from 12.4 percent for the smallest to Table 2 presents the coefficients of Regression 2. None of the deciles exhibits any significant time trend in the difference between the return in January as opposed to other months over the entire period of the study. Table 3 and Table 4 focus on the period following the January effecrs reintroduction. Table 3 shows a small reduction in the magnitude of the January premium in recent years across all deciles, but the reduction does not approaches statistical significance in any decile. Table 4 addresses the recent time trend in the January premium return. The signs of the trends are mixed across deciles, and none of the trends approaches statistical significance. The bottom of Table 3 shows that in the 1977-93 period, the excess January returns for the equally weighted index were still quite large, averaging 2.9 percent across the period.
RESULTS
All in all, the regressions reveal no significant support for a contention that the January effect is disappearing. Figure 1 charts the magnitude of the January premium returns, by decile, for six recent five-year time periods. The January effect is clearly present in all subperiods shown. No tendency toward disappearance is evident. This finding has two possible explanations:
• The January effect is not a manifestation of market inefficiency. That is, it provides no opportunity for investors to earn abnormal rates of return.
• Theyqnancial market is highly inefficient. When confronted with opportunities to make abnormal returns, insufficient numbers of investors-because of agency problems, risk aversion, inertia, or other obstacles--act so as to eliminate these opportunities over reasonable periods of time (decades). In support of the first explanation, Bhardwaj and Brooks argued that after considering the differential transaction costs on stocks responding differentially to the January effect, typical investors cannot earn statistically and economically significant abnormal returns by playing the January effect. 6 Indeed, they showed that transaction costs are largest for small, low-priced firms, which congregate in our smaller size deciles.
Individual investors, however, are likely to attempt to exploit the January effect through mutual funds. Because all the participants in a mutual fund share the transaction costs, the marginal costs associated with the trades triggered by an investor's switch of funds from a money market account to a small-capitalization stock account at year-end are unlikely to discourage such attempts to exploit the phenomenon. As such attempts increase in popularity, mutual funds investing in issues tending to show high returns in January should begin receiving inflows of funds, initiating more pur- aal measures the magnitude of the January effect over the first period. ba3 measures the increase/decrease in the January effect from the first to the second period; therefore, the net January effect over the second subperiod is al + a3, which is reported in the last column. *Significant at the 5 percent level.
Financial Analysts Joumal / January-FebnJary 1996 chases in December. Their purchases in December should force the January effect to slide into the preceding year. Because there has been no tendency, thus far, for sufficient numbers of investors to cause this to happen, perhaps the risk associated with the "arbitrage" dissuades enough investors from taking action to allow the effect to persist. The transaction cost problem can also be circumvented by taking advantage of the effect through futures contracts. Long positions can be taken on indexes that are roughly equally weighted, such as the Value Line contract or contracts on indexes of small stocks (e.g., the recently introduced contract on the Russell 2000 index). Market neutrality can be accomplished by simultaneously taking short positions on contracts on capitalization-weighted indexes of large stocks, such as the S&P 500. The fact that the introduction of these futures contracts has failed to dampen the magnitude of the effect may again reflect an unwillingness on the part of most investors to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities that are associated with significant risk.
CONCLUSION
We find no evidence that the January effect has disappeared from the New York Stock Exchange in recent years. Perhaps it is not a manifestation of market inefficiency and hence is not arbitrageable, or perhaps markets may be slower to arbitrage away inefficiencies than previously thought. Perhaps the market is quick to act only on relatively 
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